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Communism and Faachm 
HE mflapse of the proletarian movement in Germany 5 I, 
complete. The "Daily Worker" may believe that lying, 
fabricated repods of the "wonderful struggle of the 
German communi 
from its readers. 
Worker" reader is redly a special psychological type, who . -1 
looks for facts instead of interpretations has long ceased b , 
not matter. 
The truth is that the collapse of Communism 
- was much more complete than the collapse of 
octacy went down without any resistance, 
I had not imbued the workers with the 
spirit, on which the communists have 




did they offer bo the Hitter hod-? What 
in the -mist press, and whost 
celebrated in advance in wnununist 
Where were these heres when the 
took possedon of thcir houses and their prop 
were they when the dcdsive moment for which 
they said they wwe waiting, atriveti? What sa&ces did 
. they make to save their movement? The communist move- 
- * ment went down in defeat witbut  stmggl~without resistance, 
: p M y  without protest German Comamunism has only one 
h e  of defense, a line of defeme which communists are loathe 
to take openly, but which they are d y  taking in their usual 
b d k t  way, Their defense can only b that to them there is 
1: no Merence between Fascism and Democrwy: that they 
t , have, thunsclvea, contributed PO small part to the victory of 
I Wtlcr, It was the communists, more than the fascists, who 
did sll they could to discrodit, not ody the German Republic, 
but the idea of democracp as well; it was the communht~ 
-. . - more than the fascists who did not atop at anything, no 
V: matter how low and disgraceful, to dimedit the Social Demo- 
t cratic movement It was the ~ ~ t s ,  more than the 
!> fascis6 who contindly taught the desperate German masses, 
+ that the source of all their troubles lies in the demomitic 
m, that if they could only establish a dictatorship and 
rid themselves of such "bourgeois prejudices" as freedom4 
justice, democracy, all their problems w d d  be solved. "As 
regards 'the class content' there a y  no distinctions between 
damaacy and fascism," declared the communists as late as 
January 1932, and another communist @did, at the same 
F. time jeers at Trots@ becatme it acenu that he also believes 
in the "lesser mil" accwding to which "Bruening'is not aa 
bad as Hitler, according to which it is not so unpleasant bo 
. -' -. stawe under Brtlening as under Hitler, and infinitely prefer- 
g ,  able to h  hot down by Groener than by Frick." ' This was the famous struggle against fascism which the 
coxkmunbts carried on. It consisted in a v h i  the 
. . r- a "wht N&'* ar brm -. 
..., - -  
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worktrs that there really was no d&rcnce to workers whether 
tbty had democracy I# fascism. The facts are dew and no 
amount of conmu& fahiications m hide the truth: Com- 
munist propaganda created the psychofogic conditions for 
the triumph of Kitl*, and the communist movement is 
paying dearly for it now. 
To console their comrades outside of Germany* tht Corn- 
munist International is not content with fabricating Unewn 
from" Germany, it even tries to "ez~plain'* to its adhercats 
that what b happening in Germany is d j  ia the best in- 
tenat of the proletarian d u t i a n .  Wbat the victory of 
fascism scents to haw aaompE&ed, accodng to the lamt 
dedamtion of the Communist In t e raaM is simply what 
the mmmu&ts wanted to do and could not The dttt ion 
d the P d & u m  of the E. C. C. I. adopted April 1, 1933, 
plainly states that it is quite satidea with the achievements 
of Hitler. Here is what the Communist Xntefnathaf has to 
say on the German ahation: 
But the fascist dictatodip, basing itself on armed gangs 
of national d s t s  and ''Steel Helmets" and ~ W C -  
ing dvil war against the working class, abolishing all the 
rights of the proletariat* k at the same time smashing 
the social democratic theory that it is W b l e  to win 
a parliamentary majority by means of elections and to 
develop peacefully towards socialism without revolutiott, 
It is destroying the d a l  democratic theory of dass cof- 
I\ 
laboration with the bwrgaoisie and the policy of the 
'%?sser evilt1 and is destroying all the dtmocra* mudma 
among the broad massea of workers. 
and 
The working dam is amally becoming convinced tlutt 
the c o n r m ~ t s  were right when for a nttmber of years 
they fought against democratic illusions, the tdd d m  
matic policy of the rcsacr evil" and collaboration with 
the bowgdde.* 
How h l y  communist this is! Even now, when it has d- 
ftrtd ib grcakst and most ignoble defeat, it finds ame t~ 
*-, VoL IS, No. I f .  
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against fascism 
'"fhia b not cmtck It is not correct ht, beca 
k not the chief m y  in the workem' 
cial faxism is our chief enemy there." 
and he sums up with the following woda: 
"From aI1 this, it is clear, that in the p 
for the revolution, we direct our chief weapon at this 
period against our chief enmy in the working class, Le., 
against sodal fascism.'" 
There is nothing new in Gusev'~ advice to his c o m m h  * 
Thia has been the communist policy for years. What is b 
temthg is that this ad* war given when the ob 
Hitterism was so near that even the blind could see it, and 
that it was given at the verg t h e  when the cbmmdnb 
raised their false wy for a united front louder &an mer, 
Who is respdble  for the split in the proietarian move- 
mcnt ? To one who is acquainted even superficially with ths 
histwy of post-war Socialism there can be no doubt abotlt thb 
answer. Have not the communists time and again poided 
themselves on this achievement? But so strong is the power 
of lies constantly repeated, that the communists have already 
convinced themselves as well as many "impartial" = d i d  
(ie., m l e ,  who art communists and dare not join tht  
communist party) that it was the h a l i s t s  who split the- 
mwwllent. 
The Communist International was organid in M a d  
1919. What was its purpose? It was not the &cation of 
the miatist movkent, but its splitting up. The Comma& 
International could have united within its ranks thc tndts - 
socialist movement of the world. The Second Intwnatiad 1 
was piactidly nondstent at the time. M y  the extnxtm 
right wing supported it and the more the proletarian magW 
became disillusioned with the war for democraq,the mare .\ 
olutimary they bemum. The Indeptndcnt Sdd 
Party of Germany, the French Socialist 
Sociatit Party, and many other parties, 
ing to join the newly orgdzed i 
s & d n t d  In th. " O o m m ~ .  a m *  l l 8 L  
1 7 1  
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Why? Because the Communist Tntemationd could 
r-' ' *&bit them as they were. They had to split first. The 
.- @mad of the t3mmunist Internat id  was: You must get 
rid, &st of all, of your reformist clement, expel them if you 
are in the majority; leave the pa* if you are in the minoriv. 
In either case of course, it meant a split. The Communist - 
International did not want to organize ail d s t s ,  or even 
all communists under its banner. IU ideal was the organiza- 
tion only of "the kt", the "most reliable'' in short, instead 
of a mass movement, it wanted an organhation of communist 
saints ody. Having organized the saints, it set out to destroy 
the sinners still left in the prole- movemenL Following 
this beticid line they remained true to their theory that the 
proletaxian revdution will be made by a "strong, determined 
revolutionary minority".? Where are these revolutionary sainb 
now? The present leaders of the Communist International 
were still unknown at that time, and those who could not 
admit the "reformists1' into the Gmmunist International bc 
cause "they are unreliablt and are capable of betraying the 
revolution", have all h a m e  . h e r s  themselves: Trotskp, 
Zinoviw, Kamentv, not to speak of dozens of lesser lights. 
The real saints who initiated the fight to exterminate the 
mliab1e socialist sinners, have all been expelled from the 
communist community of saints. Their policy, however, is 
continued even today. 
But what about tbe United Froat? Are not the com- 
munists constantly damoring for a united front? W e  shall 
not dwell upon the entirt qu~tion of a united front here. 
The reader will 6nd a d i d o n  of it in a pamphlet by Au-t 
Tyler, 'The United Front". What interests us is whether the 
German communists did redly want a united front. When 
the fascist waves began to risc so rapidly that Hitler's victory 
seemed imminent, a group of the German Democratic ParQ 
had an interview with the l d c r  of the German CotpmUPist 
Party, Thaelmana, They wanted to learn what chances there 
were for a united front against fascism. What did Thaetmann 
- --j - 
tell them? H e  repeated m e  of the ,usual dademus 
ments against the Social Democratic Fhrty, and added thst 
"an alliance between the Social Demoeratic ParQ of Gtmanp 
and the Communist Party of Germany was imp&& w tha 
basis of these fa- and also for of prWplc" For' 4 I
"reason of principle" , thedore the m u n i a t s  annot enter- 
into an alliance with the Sodal -tic Party. What = 
these reasons of principle? Naturally. the theory of sad&?:: 
fascism. As long as cmmunists hold this theory, no one caa . 
seriously b e h e  in their cry for a united front. Thaefinaan, , ' 
as well* as the communists, in general, evqwhtrt, do not I [ - f rralire haw ridiculous they appear by talking about a united 
I front from below. 'We commuaisbs, who r+jcct urg acmd 
with the Social Democratic leaders.. . repeatedly dedarc."saya 
Tbaelmmn, ,"that we are at all times ready for the anti-fas- 
cist struggle with the militant Social Democratic and Rcichs- 
banner comrades, and with the lower militant or@zations." 
In other words, the communists will allow militant m w n b  
of the Social Democratic Party and the Reichabanner to join 
them in their fight against f&, and as the "real enemf is 
not fascism but social fascism, these militant members of the 
Social Democratic Party will be allowed to k h t  their own 
party under the banner of the (=ommudst Party. 
This is the United Front that the German Cammunbt 
L -' 
ParQ w a n d  
In. -- 
Just as the German 
of toleration towards b 
socialist movemeat had a 
German Social Demmtic  Party, 
who, with grave misgivings, watched the 
ism of the German Social Demomats was 
bat open criticism was restrained because 
German comrades." There were, of cou 
were ready to applaud anything that the 
did, and to raise to  the dignity of 
. - .  
the Gennan a d a l b t s  were compelled to 
the sdaliats who were w scared by Bol- 
to accept anything if only it 
revolatioa. Their namber was dl. But 
ho were witid of the German Sodal Dem* 
crab kpt dent, thisl small p u p  was very dcula te .  They 
were so foud in their praises of ewqthhg that the Social 
-ts of Germany did, that many assumed that their 
pmks were the offidd attitude of inkmationat s o d i m  
tmmh the German Soud Demomtic Party. 
The German Social Democratic Party had tried a new ex- 
periment It was an experiment of g m s s - o p p o ~  In this 
groas-opportunistic qeriment, it departed from most of the 
fundamental principles of Marxian Socralrsm . . . Since 1914, it 
has practidly given up the Marxian concept of a s s  strug- 
g£e and of mdal revolatioa The civil peace proclaimed by 
the German Social Democratic Party at the outbreak of the 
war, was continued through the period from the German rev* 
lution to the victory of the counter-dution. Thrwgh all 
these years, when the German Social Democratic Party was 
either at the helm of the German Republic, or the most power- 
ful oppoeition party, it followed the principle of civil peace 
I instead of tbe class struggle. This exptriment in opportunism was watched anxiously by evwy socialist throughout the 
1- wosld The watch is now at an end. The results are known 
to dl. The experiment was a miserable failure. 
The underlying principle of the tactics of the Gmnan 
Social Democratic Party was that Soddim is a purely po- 
litid matter. The term political was again nar~owed duwn 
to pure parliamentarism. Socialism will be voted in. There 
is nothing more that one can do to attain Socialism than to 
vote for d s t  candidates. There is nothing for a sodalist 
party to do but to conduct election campaigns successfully. 
The German Social Democratic Party had educated its mem- 
bers accodhg to this principle. So well were they educated 
that nothiig could induce them to betray k k l i a r n  at the 
Mot h Even after Hitlefcame to power, under conditions 
of fascist tmor ,  the Soda1 h o m a t i c  Party retained its 
C 10 1 
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voting strength It laat very few d ib 
election. But i 
it, when it became 
and well organized Social -tic Party of 
trade unions, the 
mitted to Fascism, the fact that they submitted without ths . 
least resistance, is due to the same &taken conqtion of tbe 
purely political socialish The German mde miom wem 
socialist trade unions. What -tly was mcant by m&W - 
trade unions? Nothing but that the German trade 
were ready to suppuu the mcialist politid campaigns an8 
vote for socialist adidam. A socialist anion once manh 
as it should mean, a proletah organization d y  to ' 
its economic power into the iight for S o u a h a  . . But tb 
Geman socialist trsde &on was only r d y  b vate bor : 
s&t candidates and forget about it until the next e b -  
tion. That is why some trade union leaders in Getrraany wem 
so ready to malte peace with the Hitter regime, and co i l i ha  
peacefully as pure and simple trade unions under hsci& 
regime. That this h e f d  peace was not made was simply 
due to the fact that the Nazi rulers r c h d  it. 
Adopting the purely political-psrliamcn~ view of §a- 
I eialism, the Socia D e m m t i c  Party, as a consequenct, 
bound to place all ita hope on political democracy, T%@ '
democracy is a powerful weapon in the class strug&$ 
t 
can be no doubt; that W i t s  should defend axad @t far 
democracy goes without saying. But the Ga& - &id 
Democratic Pasty did not content itself with using d&mtmcy 
for Socialism. Instead, it s a d c a d  Sodalitrm for & a w .  
Democracy became, for ik, not a meam to an era$ but sn 4 . 
in itself. All distinctions between s d a W  d ~ i t a J i &  dcm- . 
ocracy were abolished. Even the a& h& that q. I -  
I ~ ~ i i n i t d f a c o n s t a n t c l a s h o f f o m m w a a  r ' ob-ted. The aonvidon was fastened upon the masses 
that dw there is politid dazmmcy, dl other mtans of 
! add -e but voting cease The self evident mth that it ray IE mccmmy to defend democmcy i M  by underno- 
mdc mans never entered their heads. Comrade Raphd 
Abramovitch, writing on the German tragedy, cxpresd him- 
L df to the effect that the wedmesa of the German S o d  
Dcmoaatic Party lay in the fact that the raIing ctasdica had 
ceased to fear it. The ntling dasws, aa well well the German 
masws, gradually realized that the Soda1 Democrats '2wilf 
nevcr WL'' 
The extent to which this opportunism demwalietd the 
German Social Democrats is shown by the fact that a large 
part of the party even tried to itrkrpret the p i c t ~ y  of f d m ,  
democratically. f i l e r ,  they said, won a majority at the polls. 
We will have to adapt ourselves to the new conditions and 
patiently wait until the next electioa If the German Socia 
Democratic Party is not now a legal and respectable opposi- 
tion of his majesty, Adolph Hitler, it is because Hitler did 
not waut it. And yet, there was a time when the German 
M l  Democrats could have prevented the growth of Fas- 
cism. They could have d e d  F B S ~  when it waa ywng, 
just as they crashed Bolshevism. "T'he republican Icadtrs," 
and among them sdalista, "were not unaware tbat the forcca 
of reaction were growing," testify hiatorha of the German 
revolution,* "but they seemed to have tficd to deceive them- 
selves with the thought that the swing to the right meant 
only the formation of a constitutional opposition!' If 'am- 
stitutional" it was all right. Demovatic principles demanded 
that the reactionary movement be given a chance to grow. 
As early as 1919, after the Sparbcist revolt was crashed, 
Philip Scheidemann raised the cry that "the enemy is at the 
right", but his cry was not heeded. 
Of course, there was a left wing in the German Sdal 
Dammatic Party. Of wurst, there were many among the 
German =cialists who fought against these opportunistic 
1 12 1 
tendencies in the Patty. 8 
and well disciphed", in 
had o strong enough grip 
left tendencies to grow and 
Social Democratic Party would have taken a 
What Now? 
For a11 practical p q m e s  there is neither a 
nor a socialist party in Germany. At present the 
Socialism is not dead; it is only stunned 
German Social Democratic Party m 
and analyzed. It is, after all, by oar 
-3 far 




T HE victory of Hitlerism in Germany, and the growth of fascism in other countries has raised anew the problwn of democracy in the socialist movement. For a meager few 
years it seemed that this problem had been settled once for all. 
The proletarian movement all over the world seemed to have 
accepted, as final, the division of socialism into democratic and 
dictatorial. Of course there was no absolute unawity ,  either 
among democratic socialists, or among dictatorial socialists 
on all points. Democracy, as well as dictatorship, is amenabIe 
to wide and varied interpretations. Nevertheless, in broad 
outlines, the problem seemed to have been settled. 
We are democratic socialists. The victory of Hitler has 
not changed our views in this regard. We can not imagine 
socialism without democracy. Democracy for us is the most 
essential part of socialism. While it is true that the aim of 
socialism is to reorganize society on a new economic basis, the 
hope of socialism, its source of inspiration, is the human lib- 
-, equality and universal Happiness that will result from 
this economic reorganization. With the exception of a hand- 
ful of socialists, the democratic socialists never confused so- 
cialist democracy with bourgeois democracy. We all know, 
very well, that real democracy is incompatible with capitalism. 
No socialist has ever believed that what is now called demo- 
cracy is really democracy. We know and realize a11 its de- 
fects and limitations, but, since the time of Marx and Engels, 
we have come to look upon bourgeois democracy as the best 
and most important weapon in our fight for real sociabst 
democracy. Together with Engels we can still say, even now 
after the victory of Hitlerisrn, "with the successful utilization 
of the general franchise, an entirely new method of the pro- 
letarian s-e h a  come into 
isstilloneofthe 
The advent of Hitlerkn has 
of soda1 democrscy, but it has re 
r€asoPing on bourgeois 
we have for long yeara put the en 
on a wrong and non-Marxian Mi 
our premises wen redly srtbjdvc. We asked *VW: do 
we want democracy? and answered : of cotme we dd I We 
asked ourselves: do we want to achieve 8dalhm B e  
cratic means ? And we answered : certainly we do. 
@&* 
ourselves: do we want to travel the dcmmtic rmd? a d  
answered: yes we do! And it seemed W many of & t&$t 
everything was settled, because all we had to do was '& liE& 
termine what we wanted Asfr any Gwman or Italian 
whether he would prefer to get socidka by dem 
ody, and he d l1  surely answer in the afErmati 
Bat, of what avail is his preference for dm- if he .& 
not even given a chance to voice his preference freely for bbo 
democratic way? 
The question must be pat objectively htead of ab- 
jectively, Instead of asking ourselves what we mu& we. 
ought to ask, what will oar enemy compel us to da The 
question is not whether we prefer the demomatic way; the 
question should be, whether our cnemy will give us a &an& 
to travel tbe preferred way. Will not our enemy bl- the 
desirable way? We are not the only party in the -e, 
and we are not the only party to decide what forma the class- 
straggle shall take. Sodalist tactics are mom often forced 
upon socialists by their enemies than chosen by themselvc~.~ 
This m i s t a h  emphasis on the subjective mpcb of the 
problem of d e m m c y  is directly ftspodble for tk 
velopment d the tendency to make a fe t id  ob -a 
a tendency that has brought great harm to the s d & t  m-4 
mat .  This tendency took root more M y  in our -. 4 
party than anyhere else, aad it Ii, now paying the 
for i t  - u j ,  
W h a t i s t h i s ~ t ~ o f ~ ?  gte8;hsis~s ... 
C 1s 1 
& h a  It o~~f1oob ,  the fact thst 
in -pitalist sociev. It over- 
democratic governments never 
extra-parliamentary and 
i u s t  interests. It over- 
ot make the use of force 
but is itself a coustant dash of forces. I t  simply 
&wes force with violence which, of course, arc not the 
ents use both. 
we had democracy all 
! our troubles wodd be over, dl our problems solved, if only 
we had sufficient patience. They confuse bourgeois democracy 
with social democracy, Instead of accepting demomcy as . . 
a means in the fight for d,they accept it as a sub- 
stitute for the fight Once we had democracy, no real Sghting 
w d d  ever be necessary* It never occurred to them that a 
time might come when the democratic way would be blocked, 
when they would be fought against and would have to fight 
back by resorting to undemocratic means. Bmrgcob dem- 
is a valuable weapon in the hands of the working class, but it 
is a h  an instrument of dam domination for the bourgeoisie. 
, As yet the power is in thc hands of the capitalist class. They 
a n  use democracy for their purposes, or abdish it if it be- 
comes dangerous for them. 
We do not agree with communists that f adm is a norr 
essay, unavoidable stage through which every capitalist 
thy must pass on its way to &. We deny &e inevit- 
abrlity of fascism, but if it is not inevitable, it surely is prob- 
able, and for this probability every s o d b t  party must prc 
pare. Those socialists who wouId try to I o d i z e  the "German 
tfagedy" are not d y  wrong, they are atso dangerous to the 
movement. The b a n  tragedy is the tragedy of sadal rc- 
f o d m  all over the world, 
f I 
If not social reformism then what? Revdution? Imur- 
~Pection? Barricades? Is that what we are to fw, 
C 16 l 
But, we are remhdtd that Ure~ohrtims m nok made at *, 
and to makt the argument stronger L d n  L olkd b this 
effect But these arguments arc d y  not -- We 
how, and would not dream of denying, that " r ~ 0 ! 1 l i h  
are not made at dl".  Neither are fadst comtm-dutbtkm 
made at dl, Both grow out of an imp- in whkh dfd= 
ism finds itself, and both may take on digmt  mpf&i r w d ~  
different circumstances. W e  know very well that 
revolutions, the m e d  uprisings about which the 
love to talk, are in advance doomed to failure, No p l -  
party, no matter how strong and well o r g u k d  it m y  b%, 
can be successful in an armed uprising against a mcrdern 
state with its modern military teddque, Long ago E q e h  
wrote in bis preface to Marx's "Cid War in FranctU && 
"the rebellion of the old style, the street fight behind bar- 
ricades which up to 1848 had prevailed, has be- anti- 
quated." He even warned his readers that uthe raling - 
by some means or another, would get us where the ri0e pqm 
and the saber dashes." The tragic experiences of the urevolu- 
tionary uprisings" which were artificially engineered by the 
communists have proved the truth of Engeld worda The 
Bolshevik revolution in Russia is no proof to the amtrmy, 
The Bolshevih fought, ~ o t  a capitalist state, but n shadow. 
Besides, the Bolshevik mvoluion in Russia was the readt d 
such unique, specifically Russian circumstances that they - 
not and wiIl not be rtpeated elsewhere. To say, as did the in- 
ternational conference of the communist opposition padat, ** 
now when soda1 reformism is dead the only way to gOdtligll 
is "the Russian way" is either to meal r gmm ignorance d 
t8c forma that made the Rmiaa revolution posuible, sr simply 
to play with words which at present arc f a d h d a ,  Tht 
Russian way is purelp Russian, so & d y  Rmhn,  that 
it can not bt hitatad. 
Our dcritidsm of social reformism is not hmmc It & 
no revo1ntZona: because it did not orgmb m e d  up- , 
That would not have been nm,ladmq a d d i m  h t  
1 17 1 
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Om d k k u n  ia that it did not use the oppw- 
t wvo1udons affordad if to fight for socialism. 
%%& &fhm rainlists did not makc the German molution, 
Wt d d  have utilked it. The revolution thrust power 
hb tI& hands. They could have deepened the revolution; 
b d  they hastened to liquidate it. Instead of using their 
power to demolish whatever capitalist forcetr were I& they 
4 their power to build up and strengthen capitalism. The 
business of a socidbt party is to be so prepared that it will 
i take advantage of every difiimlty in capitdim to further the interests of d s m .  
r 
There is no one way in which the proletariat may get 
political power. It may get political power as a result of the 
utter collapse of the existing state power as in Russia; as 
a result of a revolution brought about by a defeat in war 
as in Germany; as a result of a successfu1 revolution as in 
Spain ; or as a result of an electoral victory as in Great Britain, 
T h e  way to political power in derrrwratic countries will, in 
dl probability, be the way of an electoral victory, if fascism 
will not intervene and make an end to democracy. The prob- 
lem is not so much how to get power as how to hold it, and 
how to use it. Social reformism has shown that it is afraid 
of power: but whoever is not ready to use power, can not 
make a bid for it. 
What was in the way of the parties which had power and 
refused to use it? It was a false conception of democracy. 
A d d b t  party in power can begin its socialist work only 
when it has an absolute majority behind it. Not less than 51 
per cent of the votes are necessary for it. This was really 
a subterfuge. It is impossible to imagine that any sdalist 
could take this "St per cent" philosophy seriously l We can, 
of coarse, very well imagine a situation in which a =&list 
party erhauld be called upon to take over the reigns of a cap- 
italist state without having the slightest chance of even b e  
@g to realize its sodalist p r o m  What should s m 
Eialist party do under auch &cumstances7 It is clear h t  
mder such  stances it can do only one thing. It w 
- h@b capitatism out of its difficulties, but in so doing it b e h p  
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w 
m- 
. . sodlsm. The &ution submi- 
International Sa&U G x h m c e  at 
this year declares:". . . It is not 
prrtiea to attempt to straighten ottt 
even to mllaboratc in such 
new or original in this deCtaratioa It 
the fundamental principles of sdabm, whi 
periences of the last years have proved to be more W@ th@WL 
ever. 
When a German d a l  democratic leader is 
did not you strengthen the position of the wwEq efaaer h 
Germany so that the reactionary forces could not rise 6 
the usual answer is : But that would have been dictatomhip! 
The fear of dictatorship has become so strong hi same 
of our movement that it has led them to abandon all thoagat 
of revolutionary transformation of society of any mrt. Bmt 
what is the dictatorship of the proletariat? Why it is c m -  
manism; the best example of it is Russia? Is Russia 
the "best example" or an example of any End of p r o b r h n  
dictatorship ? No socialist dl admit that. Due to the sped& 
and unique circumstances under which the Bolshevik pafQ 
acquid state power, the proletarian dictatorship &era has 
taken on a fotm and eontat that is esptcially adapted to 
Russian conditions. The Bolshevik party has aaqairad pmm 
in a country that had neither a well orgmhd wurIdng cIa& 
nor a well organized bourgeoisie, a country which had na 
democratic traditions, a country that was economically 
devel@ and culturally backward. Tt is natural tbat a d b  
t a t d p  in such o country should be quite Werent h 
what a Uproletdan dictatorship" would be in any other e- 
try. What we have in Russia at present is n 
of the proletariat, but a dictatorship over the 
even a dictatorship of the communists over 
but rather a dictatorship of a bureaucratic 
communist pa* as well as over every m e  else, fs 
ideal of proletarian dictatorship? Deddedlg not. No 
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the mmmu&ts who refuae b tala 
eoen mar the IdeaI of proletarb die 
t p&y which wiI1, in one way or mother, 
te m, and will proceed to use it for the bdd- 
iam, wiIl inevitably meet with opp&tim from 
supporters of the present order. It will have to 
Mend itself againat opcn d conceded warfare and sabo-. 
It wiIl thm either suppress these oppmitions its m t e  
power, or submit to them. If it wilf suppress, it wilt use dk- . 
tstorial measures (which in reality every bourgeois demo- 
-tic sta te  uses). If it will submit, it will simply give up its 
fight for socialism. A &t government that will p r o d  
to nw t h ~  state for the building of W i s m  will meet many 
obstacles in its way, mch as obsolete capitalist idtutbm, 
reactionary officials and d i m d  bat nevertheless powerful 
M t i o n a .  It will have to abolish the insdtutiwa, replace 
these offidds, break these tiaditionst, or submit to them. If 
it submits, it is giving up its fi&t for socialism. Some wsa 
haa once said, that what sofiaIi mast be prepared for h not 
a revolution but a muater-~evalution. Once W s t s  wilf 
gain power, wen in the most legal and dunomtic mnnner, 
if they wil l  try to use this pwex to abolish capitalism thcy 
will be faced w41 a bmrgds (or fascist) counter-revoltltiw1 
They will have either to suppress this counter-mlution, w be 
suppressed by it In the former case, they will use dictatorid 
m- to dear the way for the tapbuirdhg and growth of 
a r d  d a l  democracy; in the l a t e  they will prepare the 
way for fascism This is the choice before the wchliist m- 
ment On this choice depends the further deveIopment, the 
fatwe successes or failures of the movement. 
Since the preceding articles were written, great 
ham talsen place in the international rodstlit movemctlt. 





tmovement, the -Id mk* ht ~ & @ ~ . t h e  Gg0l.a 
. ~ , ~ w i n g l ~ ~ ~ - * s u l ' ~ ~ t o  - 
of Commnninm in 
death of d dmnb. After the 
iIBm, which both cumm 
. sbep in the CVQIution of 
Qnly eighteen out of 
to be held in 19347 How diEerently the delegates to the - , 
ference would now talk and act1 
b#p &My 
~tre@med. The 
u the if& 
changes that have 
Genuan sda l  Democrats. 
artor d t b e d  by the German labor movement which lost 
ifs sensed direction during the waP, was that "it took over 
control of the state . . . sharing it, aa a matter of coume, 
with the bowpob partits!' In its new program, the German 
C ~ o d a l  Democratic Party promiges that when it again gets 
. state control it will oqganh "a strong revdutiqnary go- 
K-. m a t  b a d  upon, and controlled by, a revolutionary maw Bsrty of the w o r h " .  ' m e  ftrst and most im-t taak 
of such a g o ~ e n t " ,  the program continues, 'krill be to 
me the p e r  of the state to make the victory of the revolu- 
tion safe, to root out any posdbiitlp of resistance." It wil l  
also immediately undertab a series of revolutionary changes 
of &tp. Among these will be the g ' ~ u p p ~ o n  f all man- 
Qtr-revolutionary agitation"; "immediate expropriation, with- 
otrt cangeasahn of large landed estates"; "immediate e*- 
-tion, without mpnsation of heavy induskies'', etc. 
A d  the new program further dcches : "only after the author- 
ity of the d u t i o n  has been M y  established and the 
. f d d - m p i e  and political aour- of power of the ronnter- 
= iWOItttion have been wmpleteIy destroyed, wi l l  the prmcss 
state on the U s  
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